Korea’s Energy Crossroads (w/ Chinho Park)

Korea’s energy sector is at an inflection point—one shaped by deepening nuclear cooperation abroad, the Trump administration’s tariffs, and a presidential transition in Seoul. These developments could reshape not only Korea’s domestic energy mix but also its role in international LNG markets, global clean tech supply chains, and joint reactor exports with the U.S. Will the next Korean administration double down on renewables, microgrids, and energy storage—or stick with the current nuclear-heavy approach? And how will Washington’s tariff and trade policies influence Seoul’s long-term energy partnerships?

In this episode, Paul Saunders speaks with Chinho Park, the Acting President of the Korea Institute of Energy Technology (KENTECH). Dr. Park served previously as a strategic planner at Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy.

This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

I’m very pleased today to be with Professor Chinho Park, who is the acting president of the Korea Institute for Energy Technology—otherwise known as KENTECH—in South Korea. He’s an experienced policymaker from Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy in the past, where he worked on strategic planning. He’s also a professor of engineering with a very strong background in solar photovoltaic and has been the head of Korea’s Energy Society and also its Solar Photovoltaic Society. Chinho, thank you very much for joining today.

Thank you for inviting me.

The first question that I wanted to ask you relates to Korea’s energy sector. There’s obviously a lot of turmoil today in the global economy, some of that related to the U.S.-China trade conflict, some more generally to the Trump administration’s tariff policies. How is this affecting energy in Korea?

I would say very much, especially the tariff. The U.S. and the Korean government recently met in Washington, D.C., and discussed trade issues in a so-called two-plus-two dialogue. The Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and the Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy attended this meeting from the Korean side. And the Korean officials stated that the dialogue was constructive with detailed discussions planned after the June 3rd, 2025 presidential election. But they also said it will be a package deal.

We don’t know the details, but overall, we expect that Korea will likely increase U.S. natural gas imports and potentially participate in the Alaska natural gas project. And cooperation in the nuclear sector seems brighter. The electric grid sector seems very promising. But the photovoltaic sector may take relative advantage or benefit due to the U.S.-China trade conflict. The EV sector and battery sector seems not very promising. And also, closer cooperation in the energy-related R&D is expected. But an issue with the U.S. government’s recent designation of Korea as one of the sensitive countries may have some effect. So that’s the first thing that I can mention.

The next thing that I think would be very interesting for our listeners to understand—Korea obviously is in its own period of political uncertainty right now. There was an effort late last year by former President Yoon to establish martial law that kicked off a few months of legal and political disputes. Ultimately, President Yoon had to leave office. There will be a new presidential election in Korea on June 3rd. And observers widely expect that the conservatives whom President Yoon represented will lose that election, and a more liberal or progressive president will come into office in Korea. What changes should we expect in Korea’s energy sector as a result of that transition? Energy has been—like in the United States and in some other countries—a contested political issue in Korea.

Well, we expect that there will be some drastic change in energy policy if the liberal party wins the election. If the conservative party wins the election—but they have not selected their presidential candidate yet, and they’re still campaigning—whoever wins in the conservative party, the conservative party’s energy policy will likely mirror the current government’s approach.

But if the liberal party’s victory happens, then it will significantly alter energy policy. For example, the distributed energy systems and microgrids will be much more promoted with renewable power together with expanded deployment of battery energy storage systems. Offshore wind projects in designated zones will be expedited and integrate PV projects like agri-PV, floating PV, parking lot PV, and industrial complex rooftop PV will also be promoted.

The current liberal party seems to keep nuclear power to supply Korea’s baseload and meet the demands due to the rapid increase in electricity for AI data centers and new semiconductor clusters. They will not take the previous liberal government’s nuclear fadeaway policy. I can say that because many top-ranking officials in the Liberal Party are making that statement. They’ll keep nuclear as an important baseload to cover the important baseload needs.

Another concept they’re talking about is the concept of energy highway. The energy highway is being discussed to transmit excess renewable electricity from the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula to the capital area of Seoul and the new semiconductor industry cluster they’re building nearby Seoul. Those things will be critical changes and also expected policy changes by the liberal party.

Sounds like some possibly big changes could be on the way. Now, in your first answer—when we talked a little bit about the negotiations with the United States—you mentioned Korea possibly buying some additional liquefied natural gas at LNG from the United States. But taking a step back from that and just looking more broadly at Korea’s foreign energy policy—if there is a change in government to a liberal or even progressive government in Korea after the election, what changes might you expect in how Korea engages with the rest of the world on energy? Certainly LNG and also nuclear—again, some of the more contested elements of Korea’s energy policy.

Well, Korea’s energy policy with foreign countries will remain almost the same. But changes in U.S. energy policy will affect the general portfolio of international negotiation or energy policy. LNG imports from the U.S. to Korea are definitely expected to increase. If I can give you some numbers—currently, Korea is the number three country in the world in LNG imports. And we are importing natural gas from countries like Australia, the U.S., Qatar, Malaysia, and Oman. In 2024, the U.S. was the number four country for LNG exports to Korea. If you look back a little bit, Korea imported only 0.1% of LNG from the U.S. in 2016, but it increased to 18.5% in 2021, and in 2024, it was estimated to be about 30%. This trend of shifting the LNG import portfolio from other countries, they’re moving toward the U.S. And other sectors like petroleum imports from the U.S. are also likely to increase.

If you look at the nuclear sector, we expect that cooperation between the U.S. and Korea will likely be more active, both in conventional reactors and also in new reactors like small modular reactors. And the export of nuclear reactors to third countries by this U.S.-Korea joint consortium will also likely be further promoted.

One good example that I can tell you about is the consortium led by the U.S.’s NuScale Power to construct a 462 megawatt Voyager 6 SML power plant in Romania. Very recently, it was announced that the Priboiu Industrial Complex in Dambovita County, Romania, was finally selected as the site. From the Korean side, Samsung, CNT, and Doosan Enerbility will be partners. So those types of activities will likely happen more and more.

Sounds like kind of a continued interest on Korea’s part in really working closely with the United States, regardless of what occurs.

Thank you very much. We’ve come to the end of the three questions. There are many other things I might ask. Perhaps we can have you back again sometime in the future. Professor Chinho Park, thank you very much for joining us today on Three Questions. Again, this is Paul Saunders. Thank you.

Thank you, Paul, for inviting me.