GCC-Central Asia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era
The Center for the National Interest is pleased to present its latest report examining the evolving relationships between the Gulf Arab states, Iran, and the countries of former Soviet Central Asia. Authored by Center Senior Fellow Greg Priddy and Research Fellow Elvira Aidarkhanova, the report analyzes the profound geopolitical and economic shifts reshaping interregional ties, from post-Cold War isolation to today’s increasingly institutionalized partnerships in trade, investment, and connectivity. As part of the Center’s Central Asia Connectivity Project, this publication offers timely analysis and policy-relevant insights into how multipolarity and economic diversification are driving new forms of engagement across Eurasia. We invite you to explore the full report at the link below.
Relations between the Gulf Arab countries, Iran, and the states of former Soviet Central Asia (CA) have gone through two major periods of change over the last four decades. When these four decades began, during the late Cold War era, there was very little connectivity between CA and the rapidly growing and modernizing Gulf Arab states. Currently, there are increasingly institutionalized interregional relationships between CA countries and Gulf countries, including growing business ties, growing cultural ties, and deepening connectivity.
The first shift involved simply the removal of the artificial barrier that had separated CA from the rest of the Islamic world as a result of Russian and later Soviet conquest and domination. After independence at the end of 1991, Russia remained by far the dominant external actor in the region, but revolutionary Iran began to play an increasingly important role, focused mostly on establishing or strengthening economic ties. The Gulf Arab states also began to slowly build relationships, beginning with modest volumes of bilateral aid financing and trade. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Saudi Arabia built the most extensive regional ties, seeking in particular to reconnect CA to the Sunni Islamic world by funding mosque construction and sponsoring hajj travel. This effort also reflected the Saudi rivalry with Iran and—given Central Asian authoritarians’ desire to control the spread of Wahhabism, especially during the Global War on Terrorism era—it led to some tensions. Trade ties remained very modest, however, at millions, not billions, of dollars in annual value. In part, this was due to the lack of economic complementarity—that is, all of these countries are primarily energy and commodity exporters rather than suppliers of manufactured goods.
The second and more recent shift is no less profound. It relates to two macro-level factors. The first is the shift toward a more multipolar geopolitical alignment. This was evident in the end of the US occupation of Iraq in 2011, the winding down of the war in Afghanistan toward the eventual US withdrawal in 2021, China’s increasing economic and geopolitical heft, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The second factor is the shift in the Gulf Arab states toward economic diversification and away from reliance on hydrocarbon for income. This shift has been driven by the energy transition and the expectation that global oil demand growth will slow and possibly begin a gradual decline. Both of these factors have driven a desire for closer ties between the Gulf and CA, as both sides look to cultivate a more multi-vectored set of economic and political relationships, diversify their economies away from dependence on commodity exports, and see enhanced connectivity as contributing to the goal of increased optionality.
While these shifts materialized gradually, one milestone that stands out is the “palace coup” in 2017 that elevated Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to de facto leadership. MBS brought economic diversification to the fore with his Vision 2030 program, deemphasized Islamic social conservatism in both domestic and foreign policy, and also brought a much more muscular and competitive bent to Saudi foreign policy, at least initially. This change in Saudi Arabia has in turn led two other important Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar—to seek stronger ties with CA and so compete with the Kingdom for influence.
As this report shows in detail, the impact of these trends has led to a sharp uptick since 2017 in both the institutionalization of relationships between Gulf Arab and Central Asian states and to a general trend toward increasing bilateral trade and investment volumes.
About the Authors:
—Elvira Aidarkhanova is a Research Fellow at the Center for the National Interest in Washington, D.C., where her research focuses on Central Asia and the Gulf States, and also leads MaruGlobal Foundation, a nonprofit organization supporting vulnerable communities. Elvira’s professional background also includes senior roles in communications and strategy in both the public and private sectors of Central Asian states, as well as participation in international research programs, including the Central Asia Program at The George Washington University. Elvira holds B.A. And M.A. degrees from Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and a second M.A. From Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University in Turkiye. She also participated in Hanyang University’s summer graduate program in South Korea and is currently pursuing an MBA at Boston University.
Contact: aidarkhanova@cftni.org
—Greg Priddy is Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest. He also consults for corporate and financial clients on political risk in the region and global energy markets. From 2006 to 2018, Mr. Priddy was Director, Global Oil, at Eurasia Group. Prior to that, from 1999 to 2006, Mr. Priddy worked as a contractor for the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) at the US Department of Energy. Mr. Priddy holds an M.A. In International Relations from George Washington University and has studies at the American University in Cairo.
Contact: gpriddy@cftni.org